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Talking Foreign Policy: 
THE IRAN NUCLEAR ACCORD1 
Broadcast quarterly, “Talking Foreign Policy” is a one-
hour radio program, hosted by Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Co-Dean Michael Scharf, in which experts discuss 
the salient foreign policy issues of the day. The broadcast on 
September 4, 2015, addressed the controversial Iran Nuclear 
Accord. 
Dean Scharf created “Talking Foreign Policy” to break 
down complex foreign policy topics that are prominent in day-
to-day news cycles, yet difficult to understand. “Talking Foreign 
Policy” is produced in partnership between Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, the only U.S. law school with 
its own foreign policy talk radio program, and WCPN 90.3 
ideastream, Cleveland’s National Public Radio affiliate. 
Archived broadcasts are available for viewing in video format 
online at law.case.edu/Academics/Academic-Centers/Cox-
International-Law-Center/Talking-Foreign-Policy. 
This broadcast featured: 
 Milena Sterio, Associate Dean and Professor of Law at 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Sterio is also one 
of six permanent editors of the IntLawGrrls blog and 
an expert in the field of international law; 
 Avidan Cover, Director of the Institute for Global Law 
& Policy at Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law and an expert in national security law. Cover has 
also litigated national security cases in federal and 
state courts; 
 Paul Williams, who is President and co-founder of the 
Public International Law & Policy Group and has 
advised parties to treaty negotiations around the world; 
and 
 Col. Mike Newton, Professor of Practice at Vanderbilt 
University School of Law. Newton has published more 
than 80 books, articles, and book chapters and is an 
expert on transnational justice and conduct of 
hostilities issues. 
 
1. Transcript edited and footnotes added by Katelyn Masetta-Alvarez, 
Kelsey Ward, and Kevin J. Vogel. 
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Talking Foreign Policy: 
Iran Nuclear Accord — September 4, 2015 Broadcast 
MICHAEL SCHARF: In mid-September, Congress will vote on the 
Iranian Nuclear Accord.2  President Obama says, “This deal is not 
just the best choice among alternatives, this is the strongest non-
proliferation agreement ever negotiated.” 3 Republicans uniformly 
oppose it. Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer says, “I believe we 
should go back and try to get a better deal.” Some experts believe 
that if Congress rejects the Accord, we will be drawn into a war with 
Iran. The stakes couldn’t be higher.  
 I’m Michael Scharf, and this is “Talking Foreign Policy.” For this 
broadcast, we’ve assembled panel of leading experts to help us 
understand the pros and cons of the Iran Nuclear Deal, right after the 
news. 
——————— Station Break ——————— 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome back to “Talking Foreign Policy.” I’m 
your host, Michael Scharf, Dean of Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law. In today’s broadcast, our expert panelists will be 
helping us make sense of the controversy surrounding the Iranian 
Nuclear Accord, which will be voted on by the Congress in mid-
September. 
Our guests today include Milena Sterio, Associate Dean of 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, who is a leading expert in 
international law. Also with us, for the first time, is Professor Avidan 
Cover, Director of the Institute for Global Security Law and Policy at 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Joining us from 
Washington, D.C., is Dr. Paul Williams, President of the Public 
International Law and Policy Group, who has negotiated treaties 
dealing with dozens of conflicts across the globe. And rounding out 
our panel from a studio in Nashville, Tennessee, we welcome Colonel 
Mike Newton, a professor at Vanderbilt Law School who is an expert 
on military issues. Thank you all for being with us tonight. 
Let’s begin our discussion by examining the history and content 
of the Iran Nuclear Accord.  Proposals for a deal to limit Iran’s 
nuclear capabilities go back to 2003. The current round of 
 
2. Congress did not end up “killing the deal.” E.g., Pamela Dockins, Iran 
Nuclear Deal Withstands Final Vote in Congress, VOICE OF AMERICA 
(Sept. 17, 2015, 7:53 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/us-
implementation-of-iran-nuclear-deal-to-go-forward/2967894.html 
[https://perma.cc/TBC8-BPNR]. 
3. Full text: Obama Gives a Speech About the Iran Nuclear Deal, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/08/05/text-obama-gives-a-speech-about-the-iran-
nuclear-deal/ [https://perma.cc/SD8E-JLKY]. 
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negotiations began in 2012 and ended with an agreement just last 
month. Colonel Mike Newton in Nashville, Tennessee, can you 
describe the context for these negotiations? 
 
MIKE NEWTON: Well sure, Michael. We don’t really have time to go 
back and describe the thirty plus years of contentious relations 
between the United States and Iran, but that of course forms a 
necessary backdrop. In more recent times, number one we’ve seen the 
Russian resurgence, the Russian attempts to reach back out and 
aggrandize their own authority and support the Syrian Assad regime 
and begin to reinitiate their dialogue with the Iranians.4 Two, we’ve 
seen the tremendous expenditure of diplomatic effort, principally by 
the United States with European allies, to rebuild the European 
sanctions against Iran but now we’ve seen those sanctions begin to 
crumble and so in some ways the agreement reflects the inevitable. 
And then lastly, we’ve seen the Obama foreign policy priority, in the 
last year or couple of years, of shifting the status quo, looking for 
places around the world where the status quo, in their opinion, isn’t 
serving U.S. interests and trying to reframe those things into ways 
that better serve longer term U.S. interests. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And Mike, at the base of all of this is the scary 
fact that Iran has acquired nuclear capabilities, is that correct? 
 
MIKE NEWTON: Well, yes, of course, they’ve acquired those in the 
face of supposedly binding UN sanctions and so their record of 
compliance with those things is not true. For example, one thing 
that’s already happening is, before UN experts get into the Parchin 
military complex, which is permitted under the agreement, satellite 
imagery shows the Iranians moving in to clean up that complex and 
try to hide the evidence of their research that was going on there, 
even in the face of binding UN sanctions.5 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And how close would they be to acquiring nuclear 
bomb material to actually use against or threaten some of our allies in 
the region? 
 
4. See, e.g., Henry Meyer et al., Putin Defies Obama in Syria as Arms 
Fuel Assad Resurgence, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Aug. 3, 2014, 6:36 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-02/putin-defies-
obama-in-syria-as-arms-fuel-assad-resurgence [https://perma.cc/VG2X-
5YGN]. 
5. Satellite Imagery Reportedly Shows Iran ‘Sanitizing’ Nuclear Site Days 
After Deal Signed, THE JERUSALEM POST (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran/Satellite-imagery-reportedly-
shows-Iran-sanitizing-nuclear-site-days-after-deal-signed-411304 
[https://perma.cc/J3NG-MQVB]. 
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MIKE NEWTON: Well, on its face the agreement prohibits highly 
enriched uranium. The Iranian line has been all along this is just 
peaceful nuclear power. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF:  But I’m saying, without the agreements, what’s 
the current status of their nuclear program? 
 
MIKE NEWTON: The White House has estimated their “break out 
time” to be two to three months.6 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, Milena Sterio. You’re an international law 
expert, and you’ve been studying this deal. Can you summarize its 
main provisions for us? 
 
MILENA STERIO:  Sure. So first of all, this deal was signed by Iran, 
and six major world countries -- five of which are permanent members 
of the Security Council, and the sixth is a representative from the 
European Union. In a nutshell, what the deal does is it will eventually 
lift oil and financial sanctions on Iran—which have been crippling 
Iran’s economy—starting sometime in early 2016, in return for Iran’s 
agreement to place limits on its nuclear production capability and fuel 
stockpile over the next fifteen years.7 Now, the deal is very, very 
specific. It’s a hundred and nine pages long and has multiple annexes, 
and so there are multiple provisions, very specific provisions, some of 
which will continue anywhere from eight to fifteen years. But after 
fifteen years, the deal will come to its end. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Okay, so basically we’re just buying some time 
before they get to relaunch their campaign to get nuclear weapons 
grade materials. 
 
MILENA STERIO: That is a downside of the deal. That is what the 
critics of the deal point out, that after fifteen years Iran could 
essentially start doing whatever it wants to do.8 We are buying time 
 
6. The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear 
Weapon, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal 
[https://perma.cc/A8YA-7CWL] (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (“If Iran 
decided to rush to make a bomb without the deal in place, it would take 
them 2 to 3 months until they had enough weapon-ready uranium (or 
highly enriched uranium) to build their first nuclear weapon.”). 
7. Id. 
8. See David E. Sanger & Michael R. Gordon, Future Risks of an Iran 
Nuclear Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/24/world/middleeast/in-pushing-for-
the-iran-nuclear-deal-obamas-rationale-shows-flaws.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/7VNF-2EHE] (arguing that after 15 years the 
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but proponents of the deal say that it’s crucial that we do this 
because, first of all, who knows what will happen in fifteen years. But 
second, during those fifteen years hopefully we can engage with Iran 
on a more diplomatic level and try to persuade Iranian leadership that 
this is really not in their best interest. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, during these fifteen years, how is the deal to 
be enforced? Is there some kind of monitoring that is allowed so that 
we know that they’re not cheating? 
 
MILENA STERIO: Yes, so the monitoring will be done by an 
international agency—the International Atomic Energy Agency—that 
will have a team of a hundred and fifty inspectors that are supposed 
to have access to multiple Iranian facilities, where they have been up 
to now conducting research and development, enriching uranium and 
doing all these things that, some of which, by the way, will be 
prohibited now under the terms of the deal.9 Now of course, the 
danger will be in the fact that Iran is the size of Texas. There are 
multiple undeclared sites and so, you know, how a hundred and fifty 
inspectors supposed to be able to monitor all this remains to be seen. 
Again, proponents of the deal say that this is the most comprehensive 
deal that we’ve ever had in terms of nuclear non-proliferation or 
nuclear kind of limitation type agreements. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, let me turn to Dr. Paul Williams. This is our 
peace negotiator in Washington, D.C.. Paul, what is the role of the 
U.S. Congress in all of this? Can President Obama just unilaterally 
move forward with this deal or does he need congressional approval? 
And, even if he can move forward unilaterally, can Congress act to 
kill the agreement if it wants? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Well Michael, surprisingly this is not a treaty. It’s 
simply an executive agreement and, therefore, despite all of the media 
hoopla and attention being paid to Congress at the moment, Congress 
actually has a very minor role in what’s playing out here as a major 
foreign policy development. Because it’s not a treaty, the Senate and 
the House are put into a position of having to affirmatively pass 
what’s called a resolution of disapproval. So, with all of the 
Republicans opposed and many of the key Democratic Senators 
 
constraints on Iran’s nuclear program will lapse, leaving Iran “free to 
produce uranium on an industrial scale.”). 
9. Iranian inspectors will play a role in these inspections. Laura Koran et 
al., U.S. Acknowledges Likely Iranian Role in Nuclear Site Inspections, 
CNN (Aug. 20, 2015, 5:08 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/19/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-inspections-
parchin/ [https://perma.cc/NK8F-9NS9]. 
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opposed, the Senate will be able, and so will the House, to pass this 
resolution of disapproval, and then President Obama will simply veto 
it and then the Senate will have to try to muster a two-thirds 
majority to override his veto and they won’t be able to.10 So the 
reality is that with just barely over 33% of the elected representatives 
President Obama will be able to undertake this major realignment of 
the status quo, as Colonel Newton pointed out. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Alright, so just to do my math, it takes two-thirds 
of the 100 Senators for a veto override; that’s sixty-seven votes. Right 
now, the Republicans have fifty-four votes to the Democrats’ forty-
eight, normally, when they vote along partisan lines. Two Democratic 
Senators have already said that they’re going to vote with the 
Republicans, so that brings them up to fifty-six. So you don’t think 
the opponents of the deal are going to get the additional eleven votes 
for the override? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: No. This whole process is more for an ability of the 
Republican Senators to put their stamp of disapproval on this and 
then, for a handful of Democratic Senators to, you know, protect their 
representative base. There is no real impact-shaping input, 
unfortunately, that Congress is having on the agreement and there’s 
no real option for them to kill the agreement if they thought that was 
in the best interest of the United States. It’s a pretty risky limb for 
the administration to be out on with this type of limited support. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Now you said it’s an executive agreement, though, 
so what happens if a Republican wins the next Presidential election? 
Can’t they just end the agreement? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Technically. If we were just talking as a group of 
lawyers, we could have a long discussion about that. I think 
politically, in reality, a year and a half from now, whatever shape the 
agreement has taken in its implementation phase, it will be well 
underway and so the conversation will not be about cancelling the 
agreement. The conversation will be about what’s our overall strategic 
approach to Iran—should we be continuing containment, should we 
be doing constructive engagement. I think a year and a half from 
now, we’re going to have a mess in terms of what our policy is vis-à-
vis Iran. There’s going to be a lot of energy focused on how to put 
Iran back in the box and less about cancelling an agreement. 
 
10. David Espo, Democrat, Republicans Differ on Iran Nuclear Deal, WASH. 
TIMES (July 21, 2015), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/21/democrat-
republicans-differ-on-iran-nuclear-deal/?page=all 
[https://perma.cc/EA75-2N8G]. 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: Speaking of constructive engagement, President 
Obama has said that the Iran Nuclear Accord will provide an 
opportunity to begin a new, more productive chapter of Iranian 
relations with the West. Let’s bring Professor Avidan Cover into the 
conversation. Avi, what’s the chance, in your opinion, that the Accord 
will be a first step in bringing Iran “in from the cold” and spell an end 
to its thirty six-year experiment with extremism? 
 
AVIDAN COVER: Well, there’s a chance, and I think there’s a better 
chance than without the agreement. You know, I think it’s difficult to 
obviously forecast plenty of the internal politics of Iran and certainly, 
as you note, there’s been thirty six-years of extremism. With that 
said, Iranian President Rouhani ran, for his presidency, on the 
position that he was going to get this deal and bring back economic 
reforms, revitalize the economy with the money—the assets that will 
be unfrozen, the sanctions that will be lifted11—and I’m sure we’ll get 
into the pros and cons of that. One hope is that a lot of that money 
will be allocated to the economy. Iran was a country that was very 
much a part of the international arena with economic relations, with 
really all of the P5+1 members, save the United States. It’s in Iran’s 
economic interest to come out from the cold if you will, or come out 
from the heat perhaps, and so we’ll see. Having said all of that, I 
think it’d be difficult to predict entirely whether it will not also 
continue some of its wayward extremist ways. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, I do understand that the public in Iran took 
to the streets to express their joy, as opposed to their protest, for 
once, over this agreement when it was announced.12 What do you 
make of that? 
 
AVIDAN COVER: Well that’s right, and so I think certainly that can 
be interpreted optimistically as a move reminiscent of the Green 
Revolution toward re-engagement with the West. It can also be 
viewed a little more cynically as a victory for Iran. Iran beat the 
United States, if you will, in the deal. It retained its right to enrich 
 
11. For a discussion of how the deal will affect President Rouhani, see Amir 
Farmanesh & Ebrahim Mohseni, What’s Next for President Rouhani in 
Iran?, THE GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/iran-blog/2015/jul/14/whats-next-
for-president-rouhani-in-iran [https://perma.cc/ZP8K-CXB4]. 
12. Saeed Kamali Dehghan & Ian Black, Thousands Take to Iran Streets to 
Celebrate the Historic Nuclear Deal, THE GUARDIAN (July 14, 2015, 5:11 
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/joy-in-tehran-at-
end-to-isolation-but-hardliner-reaction-to-nuclear-deal-feared 
[https://perma.cc/DD2X-EPCW]. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
Talking Foreign Policy 
336 
nuclear power and there are those, I think, who can see it from that 
perspective as well. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Mike Newton, is that your view? 
 
MIKE NEWTON: Well, I mean, to put it in the context of a divorce 
setting, one party gets everything they wanted locked in on a 
permanent basis. The other party gets a very small fragment of what 
they started out wanting on a temporary basis. If you just frame it 
like that, from the perspective of the Iranians it’s a big win, and 
President Rouhani is claiming it as a major victory. I think Avi’s 
exactly right. If, in fact, they spend a good portion of that surge in 
income—some estimates are more than a hundred billion dollars in 
the short term, much more over the longer term—on their economy, 
there’s a chance that it really does solidify the civil society and Iran 
and bring back some structure and some engagement. On the other 
hand, if the majority of that goes into weaponry to solidify regional 
hegemony and continues to fund terrorism in the region, then that’s a 
big problem. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, with that thought, it is time for a short 
break. When we return, our experts will weigh the pros and cons of 
the Iran Nuclear Accord, so stay with us. 
——————— Station Break ——————— 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Welcome back to “Talking Foreign Policy,” 
brought to you by Case Western Reserve University and WCPN 90.3 
ideastream.  I’m Michael Scharf, Dean of Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law. We’re talking today about the Iran Nuclear 
Deal, which will be voted on by Congress in mid-September. Our 
expert panel includes peace negotiator Dr. Paul Williams, military 
expert Colonel Mike Newton, international law expert Milena Sterio 
from Cleveland-Marshall Law School, and Professor Avidan Cover, 
Director of Case Western Reserve’s Institute for Global Security Law 
and Policy. 
Before the break our experts were describing the main provisions 
of the Iran Nuclear Accord. In this next segment, we will provide a 
critique of the Accord. Let’s begin with Professor Avidan Cover. Now 
Avi, before the broadcast began, you told us you were a proponent of 
the Accord.  As such, what were you most pleased about in the 
agreement? 
 
AVIDAN COVER: Sure, and I just want to qualify for a moment: while 
being a proponent, I think I have to say I’m a begrudging proponent. 
I think it’s a deal that—and we can probably get into this—I don’t 
think there are many other alternatives and I think we need to look 
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at this deal and find what is best in it. And I think primarily, if you 
think about what the primary objective of all of these negotiations 
has been, has been to push back, has been to stop Iran’s nuclear 
capabilities, its nuclear weapons capabilities and this deal does this. 
As we understand from experts, some people suggest that Iran was 
really just weeks away from developing a nuclear bomb, known as 
“breakout time.” This deal will push it back to upwards of a year. 13 
It’s not a lot, some people might say, you know, we want more. Sure, 
we would want more, but as Milena described, this deal will last for 
ten to fifteen years. It buys us time. It’s not perfect, but it keeps us 
from going over the brink. It’s a step. You know, I think that we did 
get some more things that we wanted. As part of the deal, 98% of the 
nuclear enriched stockpile will be removed. Two-thirds of the 
centrifuges will be removed. The inspections regime is viewed as 
unprecedented, the most rigorous inspections regime that we’ve ever 
had with nuclear agreements. There are plenty of problems with this 
deal. No one is happy about some of these sanctions being lifted and 
the mischief that Iran may be able to do, but if you think back to 
what this deal was primarily about, it will push Iran back from that 
breakout period. It buys us time and with that hope that things will 
change over that ten- to fifteen-year period.   
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Well, let’s go to Nashville to our military expert 
Mike Newton. Mike, you heard what Avidan Cover just said. Would 
you say President Obama delivered on what he promised? 
 
MIKE NEWTON: Well, you have to go back and just frame it from 
exactly what he promised. He said many, many times, “I’m prepared 
to abandon these negotiations if we cannot get a good deal.” So, you 
know, if what was really going on was his goal to simply reopen 
dialogue to, as you said earlier, bring Iran in from the cold, then he 
delivered on what he promised. But if you judge us but what he has 
said, he said more than twenty-eight times, you know, “It’s a red line. 
We will not allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon.” Well, in fact, we 
will. He said that at the most visible time when negotiations were 
going on in secret, during the 2012 campaign in one of the presidential 
debates. He said, “While I’m president, we will not allow Iran to get a 
nuclear weapon.” Fine, so he just arranged it that future presidents 
have to deal with that. So, by that measure, he kept his promise. The 
 
13. Obama: Iran Will Face Longer ‘Breakout Time,’ Though Not 
Indefinitely, NPR (Aug. 11, 2015, 5:09 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/08/11/431652556/obama-
iran-will-face-longer-breakout-time-though-not-indefinitely 
[https://perma.cc/86YD-C2DF] (“There’s a general consensus that the 
current breakout time is around two to three months, and that would be 
extended to around a year under the agreement.”). 
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sanctions regime, which I know we’ll talk about, is deeply flawed. You 
know, over and over and over again, the Energy Secretary and Ben 
Rhodes from the National Security staff and the Secretary of State 
and the President all said, “anytime, anywhere sanctions.” Well, so 
what we ended up with is “sometimes, some places, by somebody, 
under some circumstances, after an extensive time delay.” So it’s 
anything but certain that the agreement, the viable parts of the 
agreement, will in fact be enforced. And then the last thing is, you 
know, there was clear discussion about the lifting of the sanctions, 
very often with this idea of “snapback sanctions.” And that, to me, I 
think is one of the most troubling parts of the deal. What we’ve done 
is we’ve created a setting where sanctions are already going away. 
The Security Council has already voted on that. That’s an irrevocable 
train that has left the station. So we’re forced, if at some point we do 
impose sanctions, to do so on a unilateral basis while the rest of the 
world laughs at us and enriches Iranian coffers. It’s a no-win situation 
just on the sanctions issue. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: And we’ll return to the sanctions question, but let 
me turn to Paul Williams to provide the big picture here, the 30,000 
foot view of this. On balance, Paul, do you consider the nuclear 
accord to be a success for U.S. interests in the region? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: I think if you look at the nuclear accord in the 
context of U.S. policy in the region it’s very, very scary. It was 
essentially negotiated and will probably be implemented in a policy 
vacuum. And we’ve talked on this interview already about an 
approach of containment or an approach of constructive engagement, 
but the reality is that, at the moment, the United States has no 
strategic approach to how to deal with the Iranians. So we’ve just 
negotiated a deal, which will allow them over a period of time to have 
the bomb and which will allow billions of dollars of sanctions relief, 
without actually knowing how we’re going to deal with the Iranian 
regime. They are still a state sponsor of terror. They are actively 
engaged in what’s happening, the conflict in Yemen, the conflict in 
Syria. Many would argue that we have ISIS, the Islamic State, 
because of what the Iranians have done in Syria and in Iraq. We have 
no policy for dealing with them and we’ve negotiated this deal. I 
would be much more comfortable with this deal if we actually knew 
how we’re going to approach and contain, which would be my 
preference, or constructively engage, which others have a preference 
for, but we haven’t even answered. 
——————— Station Break ——————— 
MICHAEL SCHARF: This is Michael Scharf and we’re back with 
“Talking Foreign Policy.” I’m joined today by four experts on the 
Iran Nuclear Accord. A recent poll indicates that the American public 
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wants Congress to block the Iran Nuclear Accord by a margin of 52% 
to 44%.14 Let me ask Professor Avidan Cover, Director of Case 
Western Reserve’s Institute for Global Security Law and Policy—can 
Congress do that? 
 
AVIDAN COVER: The short answer is “yes, theoretically.” What’s 
known as the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act is really all about 
sanctions relief, right, which is really what comes down to what 
Congress’ role is here. In a number of statutes, Congress had given 
the President authority to waive sanctions for various behavior by 
Iran regarding nuclear weapons. This act would give Congress the 
authority to disapprove that ability to waive that relief. Congress 
could theoretically do so. I think Paul’s gone into good detail about 
the lack of a likelihood that Congress will be effective in doing so— 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But they are likely to pass the law. 
 
AVIDAN COVER: The law has been passed, and I think that the 
question is whether they will vote to disapprove the President’s 
ability to waive those sanctions. I think that is likely, too. The 
President will, in all likelihood, veto that and they will not be able to 
muster enough votes to override his veto. You know, whether this is 
legitimate as a matter of constitutional law, I think it is. I don’t think 
it’s a violation of separation of powers, for example. And that is in 
part because, as Paul noted, this is an agreement that is not a treaty. 
It’s a non-binding executive agreement and these sorts of agreements 
are conducted all the time in our foreign diplomacy. It’s something 
that I actually have some misgivings about, but I think it doesn’t 
seem like this constitutionally is raising ire. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Why does Iran trust this agreement given that, if 
it’s an executive agreement and only the President really controls it—
and we’re in the middle of an election cycle—that there could be a 
Republican President and he or she could just decide, ‘I don’t want to 
go forward with this agreement anymore.’  
 
AVIDAN COVER: There has always been that possibility, and similarly 
on the Iranian side. The Parliament could’ve put a kibosh on it on 
their side. This is not a treaty; it’s not a binding agreement. It’s 
 
14. CNN & ORC International, Cnn/Orc Poll: Obama, Iran, And The 
Economy, CNN 11 (July 28, 2015, 9:53 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/28/politics/cnn-orc-poll-data-july-28-6-
am-embargo/index.html [https://perma.cc/F6DL-73V4]. 
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called a ‘joint comprehensive plan of action’15 and so there’s a level of 
good faith and diplomacy that goes into all of this, but this is the way 
that foreign relations have been conducted for, really, centuries. You 
think back to Nixon’s normalization of relations with China. That 
was done through a non-binding executive agreement. FDR’s 
agreement with Great Britain during World War II to assist them. 
That was a non-binding executive agreement. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Okay, so let’s say a year and a half from now 
Donald Trump or one of the other Republicans is the President and 
he quashes the agreement. Some say that would draw the United 
States into war with Iran; others say it would be the worst of both 
worlds—an erosion of the sanctions and an immediate escalation of 
the Iranian nuclear program.16 Let me ask each of our experts to 
weigh in: if you were the next President and you had that option, 
what would you do and why? Milena? 
 
MILENA STERIO: I agree. I think going back on the agreement would 
be the worst of both worlds. I think, when you talk about diplomacy, 
any time that you’re trying to entice a rogue regime to change its 
ways, I think you’ve got to have a carrot and a stick. And I think this 
agreement accomplishes that by providing a carrot to the Iranians, 
saying, ‘We’re going to lift the sanctions if you comply,’ and then the 
stick are the sanctions. And we can debate about how well this is 
going to work but I think that this is, diplomatically, a very 
significant agreement and I think going back would be a huge step 
backwards. I think it would definitely escalate relations with Iran and 
I think the danger is we would wind up with another war like the Iraq 
war, which would, I think, entail a lot of casualties and not 
necessarily resolve anything in the long-term. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Paul Williams, do you agree? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: I think a year and a half from now, whether it’s a 
democratic or republican president, the course of action will be 
obvious. Either the U.S government will come up with a strategic 
 
15. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION 1 (July 
14, 2015), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3ABZ-CDG6]. 
16. See Frederik Pleitgan, What Iranians Make of the Tough Talk from 
Republican Candidates, CNN (Sept. 16, 2015, 8:46 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/16/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-
republican-debate [https://perma.cc/KP3L-5YUL] (reporting that 
Donald Trump, Marco Rubio, and Carly Fiorina have stated that they 
would “cancel or change the nuclear agreement recently signed between 
Iran and world powers . . . .”). 
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approach and the Iranians will choose economic development and 
democracy over regional hegemony and the deal would be a signal of 
amazing success. Or the Iranians will be running amuck in the Middle 
East, still being a sponsor of state terror, still seeking to have proxy 
wars with the Saudis to destabilize their enemies and reneging on the 
deal would be the worst of our problems.17 So, I think a year and a 
half from now things will be pretty clear. It’s a risky environment to 
be playing in and I’m not terribly optimistic.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: But even under the worst case scenario, Mike 
Newton, are we talking about all-out war, or would the more likely 
course of action be, maybe, a proxy Israel doing some airstrikes on the 
nuclear facilities where Iran is building these bombs.  
 
MIKE NEWTON: Well, I think the war-or-peace scenario is in many 
ways a false dichotomy because there is a proxy war and, remember, 
that the Iranians—in the context of activities in Iraq, in the context 
of funding Hamas—have already been waging a proxy war and the 
only real question is, to go back to your proxy question, is do we 
choose to reengage in that same proxy war? I think that Paul’s right. 
In a macro sense, in a year and a half or two years, the large policy 
becomes pretty clear, but if we wait that long to establish things like 
channels for support to people that would fight a proxy war on our 
behalf, we’ve waited too long; if we begin to establish things like real 
military planning for how would we accomplish “x” military task, 
we’ve waited too long. We need to be thinking about those things 
now in the context of a larger strategy.  
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So, let’s say they have the nuclear bomb. I mean, 
Iran has had chemical weapons for a long time. They haven’t used 
those against Israel or any other country in the Middle East. What 
makes us think that nuclearized Iran would necessarily be any more of 
a threat than India or Pakistan when they got the bomb? Mike? 
 
MIKE NEWTON: Well, that’s a good question. One thing is the notable 
threats. On July 25 of this year, the commander of the Revolutionary 
Guard did a Facebook posting, and I’ll just quote it because it’s 
 
17. See Brian Murphy, Iran Nuclear Pact Stirs Hope – and Fear – of New 
Political Order in Mideast, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/saudi-king-give-
cautious-nod-to-iran-nuclear-deal/2015/04/03/aeb04901-e608-4735-8bf3-
4dfd71c4c74d_story.html [https://perma.cc/D8Z4-943N] (regarding the 
proxy wars, the article states that “[t]ensions have further escalated as a 
Saudi-led coalition carries out airstrikes in Yemen aimed at weakening a 
Shiite rebel force, which gulf leaders say receives support from 
Tehran.”). 
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interesting. And the question is do you believe people when they 
chant “Death to America! Death to Israel!” He says, “Once the 
Supreme Leader orders all forces to start jihad, we can reduce Israel 
to dust in 24 hours.”18 That’s impossible right now without a 
deliverable nuclear weapon. In the context of a deliverable nuclear 
weapon, that’s possible. And then some have also speculated about a 
larger threat to the U.S. Iran, for regional hegemony, does not need 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. And yet, there’s been intelligence to 
indicate that they’re beginning to want to acquire that technology 
and that the Russians and others are more than happy to facilitate 
that. So we really are looking at a large strategic shift and, as just a 
military professional, I think all military professionals out there would 
say that you don’t wait until it’s the very worst case; you get 
proactive and you think about, “What is the strategy?” and “What 
are the available military options?” and, more importantly, “How do 
we shape the strategic environment in ways that really do serve U.S 
interests long-term?” 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: Professor Avidan Cover. 
 
AVIDAN COVER: I think it’s interesting; in some ways, I think Iran 
has had incredible strategic power just in simply having this 
proximity to the capability of having nuclear weapons. I don’t know 
that, to use your hypothetical, obtaining one nuclear weapon will 
change matters. Israel, by all accounts, has 200 nuclear bombs.19 
Would Iran—Iran is not ISIS—Iran, with very rational leaders—
notwithstanding by any means their designs and their objectives, they 
are rational actors—would they really use a nuclear bomb against 
Israel, a weapon that they might not know will be successful, when 
Israel has that sort of capability and numerous other capabilities? 
They have had numerous other weapons and they have not used them 
against Israel, notwithstanding the proxy wars that have been going 
on. And so, I think you need to look at lots of game theory and these 
other aspects to really think how much that will change matters. In 
some ways, Iran has great leverage right now. I don’t know if they 
would actually want to spoil things for themselves.  
 
 
18. Michael Segall, The Nuclear Deal: No Pause in Iran’s Vow to Destroy 
Israel, JERUSALEM CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Aug. 16, 2015), 
http://jcpa.org/article/nuclear-deal-irans-vow-destroy-israel 
[https://perma.cc/8UJP-K86S]. 
19. See generally Glenn Kessler, Iran’s Claim that Israel has 400 Nuclear 
Weapons, WASH. POST (May 1, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2015/05/01/irans-claim-that-israel-has-400-nuclear-weapons. 
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MICHAEL SCHARF: So, Paul Williams, you’ve mapped out two 
scenarios and you said we’ll have to wait a year and a half to see 
which one will come about, but can’t we actually look at the situation 
involving North Korea and its attempts to build up nuclear bombs to 
give us a sense of what is likely to happen here? 
 
PAUL WILLIAMS: Yeah, I think if you look at North Korea it bodes 
not terribly well for what’s going to happen in the Middle East. It’s 
not about just getting a deal and putting pen to paper. In my 
experience in peace negotiations, that’s the fundamental mistake that 
parties make, the idea that they sign an agreement and then all is 
good. And the issues with the North Koreans, we did various 
agreements and then did not fully implement them. We did not have 
a strategic approach. Dealing with the situation in the Middle East is 
extremely complicated; even though it’s a 107-page deal, as Milena 
pointed out, it’s not just about signing a deal. It’s about a lot of 
moving pieces: the Iranians, what’s happening in Syria, the Yemenis, 
the Israelis, Saudi Arabia. I got to tell you, lately we don’t have a lot 
of positive experience with formulating and implementing complex 
strategic approaches to the problems around the world. We’ve got a 
string of failures in Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Syria. I’m not seeing a whole 
lot right now that leads me to believe that what we’re doing with the 
Iranians will be any different than what we’ve done with these other 
important players and important countries, in the last few years and 
that’s what makes me very nervous. 
 
MICHAEL SCHARF: So back to Avi Cover. How would you distinguish 
this situation from North Korea? 
 
AVIDAN COVER: I agree that the North Korea example is not a terrific 
one, and may not bode well. That said, there are some important 
distinctions. 20 I mean, North Korea was about as isolated a country 
as you could have ever had. Iran is not that country. As we’ve 
discussed, it had economic relations and good relations with a number 
of European countries, with Russia, with China. It’s not in their 
interest to be isolated, whereas North Korea has certainly gone that 
route. North Korea was further ahead in its nuclear weaponization 
than Iran and, frankly, could have done a lot more harm probably 
immediately to South Korea than could Iran to its neighbors, 
notwithstanding its actions. And finally, and maybe most critically, 
that was really a bilateral agreement just with the United States, 
 
20. See also George Perkovich, Why the Iran Nuclear Deal is Not the North 
Korea Deal, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/28/why-iran-nuclear-deal-is-not-
north-korea-deal/i7wa [https://perma.cc/XGL6-BMS] (distinguishing 
the situation in the Middle East from North Korea). 
